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The thesis which I wish to present in this lecture is the following. A great number of 
discussions in early Indian philosophical literature betray a common presupposition, 
which I will call the correspondence principle. The discussions concerned belong 
primarily to the first half of the first millennium of the common era, even though there 
are also later manifestations of the principle. It seems that the principle occupied the 
minds of practically all Indian philosophers during a certain period of time, and that 
subsequently it only survived in some schools. 
 What is the correspondence principle? I propose the following, approximate 
description: "the words of a statement correspond, one by one, to the things that 
constitute the situation described by that statement". This principle is unproblematic in 
the case of many, perhaps most, statements. Take "John reads a book"; this statement 
describes a situation where there is John, a book, and the activity of reading. A similar 
analysis is possible in the case of many other statements. 
 Sometimes, however, the situation is more complicated. Consider the following 
example. The statement "John writes a book" does not describe a situation where there 
is John, his book, and the activity of writing. For the book is not yet there. If it were, it 
wouldn't need to be written. Similar problems arise in connection with statements like: 
"He makes a pot", or: "the pot comes into existence". In these last two examples the pot 
is not yet there while it is being made, or while it comes into existence. 
 It will be clear that the correspondence principle leads to complications in the 
case of statements concerning the production of things, as well as in certain other 
situations. Did the ancient Indians really accept this principle, even in these problematic 
instances? Did they really hold on to the parallelism between the words of [2] a 
sentence and the things constituting the situation described? In order to show that they 
indeed did so, I will cite, by way of example, a passage from Ía∫kara's BrahmasËtra 
Bhå∑ya, in which he argues for the so-called satkåryavåda, the position according to 
which the effect pre-exists in the cause. This passage confirms explicitly that it is 
                                                
*  This is the somewhat modified text of a lecture given at the University of Kyoto on April 26, 1996. The 
final text has profited from critical remarks made by several scholars in the audience. Some overlap with 
a few other recent publications of mine could not, unfortunately, be avoided. 
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indeed the presumed parallelism between words and things that leads to problems. The 
satkåryavåda is presented as a solution to these problems:1 
 
If the effect did not exist prior to its coming into being, the coming into being 
would be without agent and empty. For coming into being is an activity, and 
must therefore have an agent, like [such activities] as going etc. It would be 
contradictory to say that something is an activity, but has no agent. It could be 
thought that the coming into being of a jar, [though] mentioned, would not have 
the jar as agent, but rather something else. In the same way one could imagine 
that also the coming into being of the components of the jar (kapåla) etc., 
[though] mentioned, would have something else as agent. If that were true, one 
would say "the potter and other causes come into being" instead of "the jar 
comes into being". In the world however, when one says "the jar comes into 
being" no one understands that also the potter etc. come into being; for [these] 
are understood to have already come into being. 
 
This passage clearly states that the fact that we say "the jar comes into being" implies 
that the jar must be part of the situation described by that statement, and must 
consequently be there prior to its coming into being. 
 Ía∫kara was not the only one, and by far not the first, to accept the 
correspondence principle, even though few are as explicit as he is in expressing their 
agreement with it. It would seem that in the time preceding Ía∫kara no thinker, 
whatever the school he belonged to, rejected it. A so far incomplete search has brought 
to light passages to that effect in different schools of Buddhism, in Jainism, and in all 
the Brahmanical schools: Såµkhya, Nyåya, Vaiße∑ika, PËrva-M¥måµså, the 
grammarian Bhart®hari, and of course Vedånta. The correspondence principle, I believe, 
allows us to understand these passages, to grasp what problems they are dealing with. 
What I propose to do in this lecture is discuss a few examples from some of these 
schools, and then to dedicate some reflections to the historical background of the 
acceptance of the correspondence principle. 
 Before we turn to other examples, note that the passage from Ía∫kara's 
BrahmasËtra Bhå∑ya which we just examined does not just draw attention to the 
problems resulting from the correspondence principle; it also offers a solution to these 
problems. The solution here offered is the so-called satkåryavåda, the doctrine 
according [3] to which an effect exists already before it comes into existence. We will 
see that all texts that discuss the problems connected with the correspondence principle 
                                                
1 Ía∫kara ad BrahmasËtra 2.1.18: pråg utpatteß ca kåryasyåsattve utpattir akart®kå niråtmikå ca syåt/ 
utpattiß ca nåma kriyå, så sakart®kaiva bhavitum arhati gatyådivat/ kriyå ca nåma syåd akart®kå ceti 
viprati∑idhyeta/ gha†asya cotpattir ucyamånå na gha†akart®kå, kiµ tarhy anyakart®kå iti kalpyå syåt/ tathå 
kapålåd¥nåm apy utpattir ucyamånånyakart®kaiva kalpyeta/ tathå ca sati gha†a utpadyate ity ukte 
kulålåd¥ni kåraˆåni utpadyante ity uktaµ syåt/ na ca loke gha†otpattir ity ukte kulålåd¥nåm apy 
utpadyamånatå prat¥yate/ utpannatåprat¥te˙/ 
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also offer a solution to them. Some other schools besides Advaita Vedånta choose the 
satkåryavåda as solution, others offer different solutions.  
 As a first example of the correspondence principle in action, let us discuss some 
verses belonging to another text that is considered to belong to the Advaita Vedånta 
tradition, but which offers a solution that is slightly different from the one presented by 
Ía∫kara. This text is the Ógamaßåstra, also known by the names Gau∂apåd¥ya-Kårikå 
and Måˆ∂Ëkya-Kårikå. The name Gau∂apåd¥ya-Kårikå is explained by the fact that this 
text is usually attributed to a certain Gau∂apåda, supposedly the teacher of the teacher 
of Ía∫kara. This attribution is far from certain, and is under serious attack these days.2 
We will not deal with it here. For our purposes it is sufficient to cite the following three 
verses:3 
 
Debating with each other, certain doctors accept that something existent comes 
into being; others, who are [equally] learned, [that] something non-existent 
[comes into being]. 
Nothing that exists [already] comes into being, and what does not exist does not 
come into being either; disagreeing in this way [with the preceding doctors], the 
upholders of non-duality declare non-production. 
We agree with the non-production declared by them; we do not disagree with 
them ... 
 
These verses present the same problem as did Ía∫kara, but the solution they offer is 
different. Where Ía∫kara maintained that something existent comes into being, [4] 
‘Gau∂apåda’ rejects the very notion that anything comes into being at all, and contrasts 
his solution explicitly with the one presented by Ía∫kara. 
 It has often been observed that some of Gau∂apåda's arguments are close to 
those of the Buddhist thinker Någårjuna. We will therefore now turn to the latter's 
MËlamadhyamakakårikå. Consider first MMK 7.17, which reads:4  
 
If any unproduced entity is found anywhere it could be produced. Since that 
entity does not exist, what is produced? 
 
Note that this is precisely the problem raised by Ía∫kara and Gau∂apåda in the passages 
considered earlier, and exemplified in the statement "the jar comes into being". Ía∫kara 
                                                
2 See, e.g., Vetter, 1978; Wood, 1990, with Bronkhorst, 1992a; and most recently King, 1995: 15-49; 
1995a. 
3 GK 4.3-5c: bhËtasya jåtim icchanti vådina˙ kecid eva hi/ abhËtasyåpare dh¥rå vivadanta˙ parasparam// 
bhËtaµ na jåyate kiñcid abhËtaµ naiva jåyate/  vivadanto 'dvayå hy evam ajåtiµ khyåpayanti te// 
khyåpyamånåm ajåtiµ tair anumodåmahe vayam/ vivadåmo na tai˙ sårdham ...//. 
4 MadhK(deJ) 7.17: yadi kaßcid anutpanno bhåva˙ saµvidyate kvacit/ utpadyeta sa kiµ tasmin bhåve 
utpadyate 'sati//. This translation follows Oetke (1992 [p. 203; cp. p. 210 f.]), who discusses and rejects 
the possibility of a logical error in this verse. 
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concluded from it that the jar exists before it comes into being, Gau∂apåda that no 
production takes place. Någårjuna seems to reach the same conclusion as Gau∂apåda. 
 Claus Oetke has analyzed a number of passages from the 
MËlamadhyamakakårikå in what I consider four important articles.5 As a result of this 
analysis he attributes to Någårjuna the following theorem: "For all x and for all y: If x is 
the condition of y / If x is the condition of the existence of y, then y must be something 
that exists during the existence of x (or: that does not exist exclusively later than x)." 
 It can easily be seen that this theorem helps to explain many arguments in 
Någårjuna's work. Consider the first two verses of chapter 19 of the MMK:6 
 
If present and future existed depending on the past, (then) present and future 
would be in the past. If present and future would not be there [in the past], how 
would present and future be depending on that? 
 
Obviously the past is the condition of the present and the future. According to Oetke's 
theorem, the present and the future must then exist during the past. This is indeed the 
conclusion which Någårjuna draws in the present stanza. Någårjuna's argument here  
can therefore be satisfactorily explained with the help of Oetke's theorem. 
 But it can equally well be explained with the help of the correspondence 
principle. The verse concerns the true statement: "Present and future depend on the 
past", in Sanskrit: pratyutpanno 'någataß ca at¥tam apek∑ya (sta˙).7 The correspondence 
principle requires that present, future and past are there in the situation described. In 
other words, present and future are in the past, present and past in the future, and future 
and past in the present. 
 This example shows that Oetke's theorem and the correspondence principle are 
equally satisfactory in elucidating Någårjuna's arguments in some cases. In some other 
cases Oetke's theorem is not applicable, whereas the correspondence principle can still 
be used. An example is the verse which we discussed earlier, and which concerns some 
such statement as "the jar comes into being". We have seen that the correspondence 
principle explains the problem at hand; Oetke's theorem, on the other hand, is not 
applicable, because this statement does not refer to two different elements that depend 
one upon the other. A closer inspection reveals that Oetke's theorem is a special case of 
the correspondence principle: all the cases that can be explained with Oetke's theorem, 
can also be explained with the correspondence principle, but not vice versa. 
[5] 
                                                
5 Oetke, 1988a; 1989; 1990; 1991. 
6 MadhK(deJ) 19.1-2: pratyutpanno 'någataß ca yady at¥tam apek∑ya hi/ pratyutpanno 'någataß ca kåle 't¥te 
bhavi∑yata˙// pratyutpanno 'någataß ca na stas tatra punar yadi/ pratyutpanno 'någataß ca syåtåµ katham 
apek∑ya tam// tr. Oetke. 
7 Note the independent use of the absolutive in MadhK(deJ) 19.1ab. 
CORRESPONDENCE PRINCIPLE  5 
 
 
 To conclude our discussion of Någårjuna, one final example. MMK 1.6 reads:8  
 
Neither of a non-existent nor of an existent thing is a cause possible. Of what 
non-existent (thing) is there a cause, and of an existent (thing) what is the use of 
a cause? 
 
Seen from the point of view of the correspondence principle, there is no difficulty in 
understanding the verse. The statement "a is the cause of b" or "the effect depends on 
the cause", along with our principle, justifies the conclusion that effect and cause must 
be part of the situation described by it. This means that the cause has an existent effect. 
Our experience, on the other hand, teaches that the effect does not always coexist with 
its cause. 
 This last example from Någårjuna's MËlamadhyamakakårikå takes us back to 
the satkåryavåda. We have seen that Ía∫kara offers this doctrine to solve the problems 
evoked by the correspondence principle. Did other schools do the same? 
 The end of Såµkhya Kårikå 9 offers the following justification of the 
satkåryavåda: kåraˆabhåvåc ca sat kåryam. This phrase is ambiguous. It can mean "and 
because [the cause] is a cause, the effect exists" or "and because [the effect] is [identical 
with] the cause, the effect exists".9 The former of these two interpretations reminds us 
of the verse of Någårjuna which we just considered. There we learned that effect and 
cause depend upon each other, and must therefore coexist. Stated differently: where 
there is a cause, there must be an effect; or: because the cause is a cause, the effect 
exists. The second interpretation is different, and has no direct link with the type of 
arguments we find in Någårjuna's work. Which of these two interpretations is correct, 
i.e., original? 
 A glance at the commentaries shows that all but one of them have chosen the 
second interpretation. The possible exception is the Yuktid¥pikå, which explains:10 
ihåsati kårye kåraˆabhåvo nåsti. This is of course still ambiguous, because we can 
translate "if the effect does not exist, [the cause] is not a cause" or "if the effect does not 
exist, [it (i.e., the effect)] is not a cause". Technically both interpretations are possible, 
but I fail to see what could be the point of the second one. The first interpretation, on 
the other hand, fits in well with the argument of Någårjuna just considered: since cause 
and effect depend upon each other, they must co-occur. As a result, there is no cause 
without effect. Otherwise put, the cause is no cause, when there is no effect present. 
                                                
8 MadhK(deJ) 1.6: naivåsato naiva sata˙ pratyayo 'rthasya yujyate/ asata˙ pratyaya˙ kasya sataß ca 
pratyayena kim// tr. Oetke. 
9 The first part could also be translated "on account of the existence of the cause". This does not however 
lead to an intelligible interpretation. 
10 YD p. 54 l. 32. 
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 This interpretation of the end of Såµkhyakårikå 9 is confirmed in another way, 
too. The *Íataka of Óryadeva is no doubt one of the earliest texts that testifies [6] to the 
existence of the satkåryavåda among the followers of Såµkhya. It has been preserved in 
Chinese translation. Giuseppe Tucci translates the words which this text puts in the 
mouth of the defender of Såµkhya in the following manner:11 
 
The effect pre-exists in the cause, on account of the existence of the cause. 
 
In this form these words do not seem to communicate anything intelligible. But it is 
easy to see that Tucci's "on account of the existence of the cause" corresponds to 
Sanskrit kåraˆabhåvåt — exactly the expression which we also find in the 
Såµkhyakårikå. I believe that the Chinese translation agrees with this interpretation. 
The correct translation should therefore be: 
 
The effect pre-exists in the cause, because it is a cause. 
 
This statement is, of course, still ambiguous, because it does not say explicitly which of 
the two — the effect or the cause — is a cause. However, the commentator Vasu gives 
an explanation which, at last, removes the ambiguity. I offer once again Tucci's English 
translation:12 
 
If the pot does not pre-exist in earth, then earth could not become the cause of 
the pot. 
 
This remark by Vasu looks like a paraphrase of the explanation in the Yuktid¥pikå 
which we considered above, and which reads: 
 
if the effect does not exist, [the cause] is not a cause 
 
 or  
 
if the effect does not exist, [it (i.e., the effect)] is not a cause 
 
But whereas the Yuktid¥pikå passage remained ambiguous, Vasu's passage specifies 
that it is the cause (in the example used: the earth) which cannot be (or become) a 
cause, if the effect (the pot) is not present. 
                                                
11 TI 1569, vol. 30, p. 177b l. 26; tr. Tucci, 1981: 61. 
12 TI 1569, vol. 30, p. 177b l. 26-27; tr. Tucci, 1981: 61. 
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 It is not possible here to discuss the complicated question of the relationship 
between the Yuktid¥pikå and Vasu's commentary on Óryadeva's *Íataka. Nor do I wish 
to impose an interpretation on the Yuktid¥pikå borrowed from Vasu's commentary. It 
seems however clear that in the earliest documents justifying the satkåryavåda in 
connection with the Såµkhya philosophy, a Någårjuna-like argument was used. This 
implies, I would propose, that this argument, and the correspondence principle on which 
it was based, played a role in the justification, and perhaps even in the introduction of 
the satkåryavåda in Såµkhya. 
 The beginning of Såµkhyakårikå 9 gives the first argument in favor of the 
satkåryavåda. Together with the final words of the verse we get: asadakaraˆåt ... sat 
kåryam. This means: "The effect exists, because one does not make what does not 
exist". This argument can be illustrated with the help of the statement "He [7] makes a 
mat". One can only make a mat if there is a mat. This, of course, only makes sense if the 
word ‘mat’ is considered to refer to something present. This, in its turn, is precisely 
what the correspondence principle claims. 
 The use of the satkåryavåda for solving the problems evoked by the 
correspondence principle is clear. Yet not all thinkers were willing to accept this 
position. At the same time, they did not wish to abandon the correspondence principle 
either. This is clear from the alternative solutions which they proposed for these 
problems. They had to find something in the situation described by the sentence "the jar 
comes into being" / "he makes a jar", to which the word ‘jar’ could refer. Note that the 
correspondence principle led, in these cases, to reflections on the denotation of words. 
Various solutions were proposed, which we cannot all discuss at this occasion. Many 
thinkers came to choose the universal as the object denoted by words (or at any rate 
nouns), sometimes along with other things, such as the individual. The universal ‘jar-
ness’ being existent and eternal according to a number of Indian philosophies, it is 
already there when the jar comes into being, or is made. We find this solution in a 
variety of texts, among them the Nyåya SËtra and Bhå∑ya, where the problem of how to 
account for a sentence such as "he makes a mat" is explicitly mentioned in the context 
which introduces the universal as one of the denotations of the word (along with the 
individual, vyakti, and the form, åk®ti). Schools like Nyåya did not have to accept the 
satkåryavåda, and chose rather the opposite position, the asatkåryavåda. 
 How did Vaiße∑ika deal with the difficulties connected with the correspondence 
principle? After what I have said so far, its position is almost predictable. Vaiße∑ika 
does not accept that the jar is already there before it comes into being. Its ontology, on 
the other hand, does allow for universals. One would therefore expect a solution of the 
kind that the word ‘jar’ denotes — perhaps along with other things — the universal. 
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The word ‘jar’ in "he makes a jar" will in this way have something to refer to, and the 
problem would be solved. 
 It is true that from a certain date onward Vaiße∑ika authors opt for this solution. 
The Padårthadharmasa∫graha, or Praßastapådabhå∑ya, does not however touch this 
problem, and nor does the Vaiße∑ika SËtra. Since we have practically no other texts for 
the early period, one might be tempted to conclude that Vaiße∑ika authors have chosen 
this solution right from the time they became aware of the problem of origination. This 
expectation is however belied by some passages describing Vaiße∑ika points of view 
preserved in the works of non-Vaiße∑ika authors, which inform us about the period 
before the Padårthadharmasa∫graha. 
 Consider to begin with a passage from the Vibhå∑åprabhåv®tti, a commentary on 
the Abhidharmad¥pa, a text of the Buddhist Sarvåstivåda school. It attributes [8] the 
following position to the Vaiße∑ikas:13 
 
The Vaiße∑ika thinks [as follows]: The substance ‘jar’, which is not present in 
the potsherds [out of which it will be constituted], and the substance ‘cloth’, 
which is not present in the threads [out of which it will be constituted], come 
into being as a result of the contact between the potsherds and that of the threads 
[respectively]. And through secondary thought (gauˆyå kalpanayå) one speaks 
of the existence of the agent of coming into being, [existence] which has as 
object a state [of the jar] which is opposite [to the present]. 
 
Mysterious as this passage may be, it states quite clearly that the jar exists prior to its 
coming into being, thanks to a secondary thought. No further details are provided. 
 If this passage has whetted our appetite, a discussion in the Dvådaßåranayacakra 
of Mallavådin and in its commentary the Nyåyågamånusåriˆ¥ of SiµhasËri will give us 
further material to think about. We learn here that in Vaiße∑ika things that have come 
into being are called ‘existing’ because of a connection with the universal ‘existence’ 
(sattåsambandha). This connection with the universal ‘existence’ takes place at the 
moment of, or immediately after, their completion; it is the reason of the denomination 
and of the idea of the things concerned.14  
 Here the following question arises: Are objects completely non-existent before 
this connection with the universal ‘existence’ takes place? According to Mallavådin, the 
Vaiße∑ikas give a negative answer to this question. Things do exist in a certain way 
                                                
13 Abhidh-d ad kårikå 310, p. 274 l. 5-7: vaiße∑iko manyate: kapåle∑v avidyamånaµ gha†adravyaµ 
tantu∑u cåvidyamånaµ pa†adravyaµ kapålatantusaµyogåd utpadyate/ gauˆyå ca kalpanayå 
viprak®tåvasthåvi∑ayå janikart®sattå vyapadißyata iti/. The word viprak®ta is obscure. The editor, 
Padmanabh S. Jaini, suggests an emendation into viprak®∑†a ‘distant’, but this does not improve much. 
Apte's dictionary gives viprak®ta, among other meanings, the sens ‘opposed’ which seems to fit more or 
less both here and two lines further down where the word is used a second time. 
14 DNC vol. 2, p. 459 l. 8-9: ... sattåsambandho 'bhidhånapratyayahetu˙. Cp. ibid. p. 512 l. 2 
(ni∑†håsambandhayor ekakålatvåt) and the two interpretations of this våkya discussed there. 
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before they come into being. True, they have no connection with the universal 
‘existence’ at that moment, but they have some kind of essence (astitva, svabhåva, 
svabhåvasattå), which allows them to come into being. This means that even without 
connection with the universal ‘existence’, a substance (or, for that matter, a quality or a 
movement) has an identity. The Vaiße∑ika, according to Mallavådin, goes to the extent 
of reinterpreting the expression asat, which normally means ‘non-existent’. The 
Vaiße∑ika takes it as a bahuvr¥hi compound, and interprets it to mean "that which does 
not have ‘existence’". The expression asatkåryavåda, seen this way, does not say that 
the effect is not there before it comes into being; it only says that is has no connection 
with the universal ‘existence’ as yet.15 
[9] 
 The main discussion takes place in the seventh chapter (lit. spoke, ara) of the 
Dvådaßåranayacakra. The asatkåryavåda of Vaiße∑ika is attacked right from the very 
first line:16 "If the effect is not present [in its causes], it would not come into being, for 
there would be no agent of the operation [of coming into being] at hand, just as [in the 
case of] a sky-flower. Or [alternatively,] also a sky-flower would come into being, 
because there would be no agent of the operation [of coming into being] at hand, just as 
[in the case of] an effect." 
 This is, of course, the familiar problem which is based on the correspondence 
principle. The Vaiße∑ika recognizes the problem, and maintains that the effect does not 
exist before it comes into being. However, there are two kinds of existence. The effect 
has no connection with the universal ‘existence’ (sattå) before it comes into being; but it 
is there, in a certain way — it has astitva. This is why the Vaiße∑ika answers:17 "Unlike 
the sky-flower, the effect, having come into being through its own astitva becomes, 
even without the relationship of inherence with [the universal ‘existence’], a support 
[for that universal]." 
 The opponent of the Vaiße∑ika then raises the question whether the universal 
‘existence’ (sattå) makes existent that which exists, or that which does not exist, or that 
which exists and does not exist.18 It is here that the Vaiße∑ika observes that one can 
deny that substances etc. have a connection with the universal ‘existence’, but not their 
                                                
15 DNC vol. 2, p. 462 l. 3-5: nanu asat ity atra naña uttarapadåbhidheyanivåraˆårthatvåt 
satprati∑edhårthatvåt katham asya såtmakatvam? na, anekåntåt, aputrabråhmaˆavad aguˆaguˆavat/ yathå 
nåsya putro 'st¥ty aputro bråhmaˆa˙ nåsya guˆo 'st¥ty aguˆo guˆa˙ tathehåpi nåsya sad ity asat/; cp. 
SiµhasËri, DNC p. 460 l. 10-11. 
16 DNC vol. 2, p. 455 l. 1-2: yady asat kåryaµ notpadyeta asannihitabhavit®katvåt khapu∑pavat/ 
khapu∑pam api votpadyeta asannihitabhavit®katvåt kåryavat/ 
17 DNC vol. 2, p. 456 l. 1-2: ... åßrayisamavåyåd ®te 'pi kåryaµ svenaivåstitvenotpannam åßrayo bhavati 
khapu∑pavaidharmyeˆa ... 
18 DNC vol. 2, p. 459 l. 1-2: iha pråk sattåsambandhåt satåµ vå asatåµ vå sadasatåµ vå dravyåd¥nåµ 
satkar¥ sattå?. Similar criticism in the Madhyamakah®dayakårikå and Tarkajvålå of Bhåvaviveka; see 
Tachikawa, 1994: 898. 
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existence through their own form; the universal ‘existence’ does not, therefore, make 
non-existent things existent.19 
 I will not bother you with all the passages in this long discussion that concern 
the state of a thing before it is connected with the universal ‘existence’. I must however 
cite the following sentence, which Mallavådin ascribes to the Vaiße∑ika:20 "And the 
[object which is asat] is not[, for that matter,] without identity, like a hare's horn. Even 
without connection with sattå, it is in our system (iha) like in another one, where 
pradhåna etc. have an identity." Elsewhere in the discussion the Vaiße∑ika recalls that 
såmånya, viße∑a and samavåya — all Vaiße∑ika categories — exist without having 
connection with sattå. But the comparison with the pradhåna of Såµkhya — for there 
can be no doubt that a comparison with the Såµkhya system of [10] philosophy is made 
here — is remarkable. For Såµkhya adheres to the satkåryavåda, and is therefore in 
many ways the exact opposite of Vaiße∑ika with its asatkåryavåda. The comparison 
shows that the Vaiße∑ikas to whose writings Mallavådin had access came dangerously 
close to the position of the Såµkhyas where they tried to solve the problem of 
origination. 
 A very important question remains to be discussed. If the Vaiße∑ikas maintained 
that things exist in a certain way before they come into being, can one determine the 
beginning of this "half-existence"? Are they there from beginningless time, as the 
Såµkhyas believed? To my knowledge Mallavådin and SiµhasËri's discussions offer no 
answer to this question. We may find the answer in another early text, the Yuktid¥pikå, 
which comments upon the Såµkhyakårikå. Around kårikå 9 this text contains a 
discussion with a Vaiße∑ika on the satkåryavåda. Where it presents the argument that 
one cannot make something that is not there — an argument with which we are familiar 
— it puts the following words in the mouth of the Vaiße∑ika:21 "But the effect is made 
by the agent etc. in the intermediate time. Which is this intermediate time? The answer 
is (follows a verse): They call ‘intermediate time’ the time during which the causes have 
started to do the work, until the production of the effect." 
 I conclude, be it with much caution, that the "preexistence" of something that is 
going to come into being is not without beginning. This passage from the Yuktid¥pikå 
                                                
19 DNC vol. 2, p. 460 l. 1-2: ... dravyåd¥nåµ sattåsambandha˙ prati∑idhyate na tu svarËpasadbhåva iti 
sattå naivåsatåµ satkar¥. 
20 DNC vol. 2, p. 462 l. 6-7: na ca tad api niråtmakaµ ßaßavi∑åˆavat, sattåsambandhåd ®te 'pi yathå 
parapak∑e pradhånåd¥nåµ såtmakatvaµ tathehåpi syåt. 
21 YD p. 52 l. 16-21: åha, nanu ca madhyame kåle kartrådibhi˙ kåryaµ kriyate/ ka˙ punar asau 
madhyama˙ kåla iti? åha: 
 årambhåya pras®tå yasmin kåle bhavanti kartåra˙/ 
 kåryasyåni∑pådåt taµ madhyamaµ kålam icchanti// iti 
yadå hetava˙ prav®ttårambhå bhavanty uddißya kåryaµ na ca tåvan naimittikasyåtmalåbha˙ saµvartate 
sa madhyama˙ kåla˙/ tasmin kriyate kårakai˙ kåryam iti/. Cp. Motegi, 1994: 815 sq.; Motegi draws 
attention to the fact that the reading kåryasyåni∑pådåt in the verse is an emendation which deviates from 
the manuscripts. 
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suggests rather that this "preexistence" starts when the different factors that contribute 
to produce the effect, i.e., to make the jar, start fulfilling their various functions. The 
intermediate time is neither without beginning, nor momentary. 
 At this point a short discussion of the early literary history of Vaiße∑ika is 
required. Which were the Vaiße∑ika texts in which the positions outlined above found 
expression? 
 The oldest clearly understandable and unitary Vaiße∑ika text which we possess is 
the Padårthadharmasa∫graha of Praßastapåda, mentioned earlier. This text may belong 
to the sixth century of the common era. Besides the Padårthadharmasa∫graha we have a 
short text that has only survived in Chinese translation, and which may have been called 
Daßapadårth¥; it is too short to derive much information from [11] it. And then there is, 
of course, the Vaiße∑ika SËtra. The Vaiße∑ika SËtra is the oldest Vaiße∑ika text we 
possess, and I am tempted to think that it is the earliest Vaiße∑ika text that ever existed. 
It, or rather its earliest version, must date back to the early centuries of the common era, 
for Vaiße∑ika is already referred to in the Buddhist Vibhå∑å.22 Unfortunately the 
Vaiße∑ika SËtra which is known to us is not identical with its earliest version. Five 
versions have been preserved,23 all of which share features that belong to a time well 
after the beginning of the system. SËtras have been added and removed, and even the 
order of the sËtras appears to have occasionally been changed so as to allow of a 
different interpretation.24 
 It is not clear until what date modifications were still introduced into the 
Vaiße∑ika SËtra. Certain is that a long time separates the earliest version of this text 
from the Padårthadharmasa∫graha. And it is also becoming more and more clear that 
during this period much happened to the system. The sËtra that enumerates qualities, for 
example, has just seventeen of them. The Padårthadharmasa∫graha, on the other hand, 
enumerates twenty-four qualities. Among the added qualities we find sound, and there 
is indeed evidence that early Vaiße∑ika looked upon sound, not as a quality, but as a 
substance, a form of wind. Another example concerns the creator god: the Vaiße∑ika 
SËtra contains no trace of a creator god, in the Padårthadharmasa∫graha he has assumed 
his position. We even have the evidence from the Yuktid¥pikå and from Ía∫kara to the 
extent that early Vaiße∑ika did not accept a creator god, whereas later thinkers of the 
school did.25 
                                                
22 Ui, 1917: 38 f. 
23 Three versions were known, accompanied by the commentaries of Candrånanda, Bha††a Våd¥ndra and 
Ía∫kara Mißra respectively; two more have been brought to light in Harunaga Isaacson's recent doctoral 
dissertation (1995). 
24 See Bronkhorst, 1993a: 80 f.; 1995. 
25 See Bronkhorst, 1993a (on sound); 1996 (on God). 
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 Most of these changes were not introduced into the system by Praßastapåda. The 
idea of a creator god may be an exception; here there is some reason to assume that 
Praßastapåda himself may have played a crucial role. Most of the other developments 
must have found their earliest expression in a number of texts that have existed during 
the long time that separates the original Vaiße∑ika SËtra from the 
Padårthadharmasa∫graha. Of most of these texts even the names will probably forever 
remain unknown to us. About a few of them, however, we have some little information. 
One is a commentary (È¥kå) written by Praßastamati, who must be the same as 
Praßastapåda, the author of the Padårthadharmasa∫graha. The other is the text on which 
he wrote a commentary, and which appears to have been well-known in its time. By 
collecting the various testimonies in the texts of other schools, I have come to think that 
this text was called Ka†and¥, and that its author was known by [12] the name Råvaˆa. 
The Ka†and¥ was itself a commentary, on the Vaiße∑ika SËtra, and it was written in the 
so-called vårttika-style, which explains that we sometimes find references to våkyas and 
bhå∑yas; the vårttika-style is characterized by the presence of short nominal våkyas 
followed by somewhat more elaborate explanations called bhå∑yas.26 
 This Ka†and¥ (or whatever may have been its name) appears to have been an 
authoritative text for quite some time. It is indeed the text to which Mallavådin 
constantly refers while describing and criticizing the Vaiße∑ika position. It seems likely 
that also the other texts we have referred to — the Buddhist Vibhå∑åprabhåv®tti and the 
Såµkhya Yuktid¥pikå — based their information concerning Vaiße∑ika on this text. 
However this may be, it seems likely that the problem of origination did not play much 
of a role, if any, during the time of composition of the original Vaiße∑ika SËtra, and that 
it came up at a later time, perhaps for the first time in the Ka†and¥, or already before this 
text. 
 I have already pointed out that later Vaiße∑ika came to adopt a solution to the 
problem of origination that was quite different from the one offered (if I am right) in the 
Ka†and¥. Later Vaiße∑ikas joined the Naiyåyikas in thinking that the fact that words 
refer to universals solved that problem. Once this solution accepted, the complicated 
distinction between two forms of existence, and the attempt to use it in order to answer 
the question how something can come into being, became superfluous, and the 
weaknesses of the earlier solution, such as its vagueness (when exactly does the pre-
existence of a jar begin?), could not but contribute to its decline. The earlier solution 
was not just refuted, worse, it was forgotten, and no one talked about it any more. I do 
not exclude that this change of position of the Vaiße∑ika thinkers is responsible for the 
fact that the Ka†and¥ and its commentary by Praßastapåda, once the main works of the 
                                                
26 Bronkhorst, 1990; 1992b; 1993. 
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school, soon stopped to be handed down. Praßastapåda's Padårthadharmasa∫graha, on 
the other hand, does not touch the question of origination; is this the reason that it 
continued to be handed down in a fairly large number of manuscript copies until today? 
It is hard to prove these suspicions, but I would like to suggest that the loss of 
philosophical texts may in certain cases have been occasioned by the fact that points of 
view changed. It may be significant that among the later authors on Vaiße∑ika, only one, 
Vyomaßiva, retains some traces of the earlier discussion by defining the effect (kårya) 
as svakåraˆasattåsaµbandha. All others define this term differently, as was pointed out 
by Masanobu Nozawa in a recent article (1993). 
 After the discussion of various Brahmanical schools, let us now consider one 
[13] more Buddhist text, the Abhidharmakoßabhå∑ya of Vasubandhu. Here the 
problems connected with the correspondence principle show up in a discussion of the 
expression prat¥tyasamutpåda. This well-known expression consists of the noun 
samutpåda "production, coming into being" preceded by the absolutive prat¥tya, which 
Vasubandhu takes to mean "having reached" (pråpya). A critic points out that the 
combination prat¥tyasamutpåda makes no sense: the absolutive refers to something 
preceding, but how can something come into being after having done something else 
before (‘reaching’ in this case)? We recognize here a problem which is close to the one 
dealt with in various ways by the authors we have considered so far: does something 
exist before it comes into being? Vasubandhu's reply is therefore of particular interest:27 
"The distinction by the grammarian (ßåbdika; Yaßomitra uses vaiyåkaraˆa) between the 
agent and the activity — [saying that] the agent is expressed by ‘he becomes’ and the 
activity by ‘becoming’ — does not obtain: we do not see here an activity ‘becoming’ 
different from the thing that becomes. Therefore there is no deception in the 
conventional use of language." 
 Vasubandhu avoids the difficulties resulting from the correspondence principle 
by presenting the Abhidharmic analysis of reality, which does not accept the distinction 
between agent and activity. Strictly speaking Vasubandhu goes here against the 
correspondence principle, which stipulates that different words should correspond to 
different "things". Yet Vasubandhu appears to be concerned to proclaim his adherence 
to this principle. This, at any rate, one is tempted to conclude from his final sentence: 
                                                
27 Abhidh-k-bh(P) p. 138 l. 4 f.: na yukta e∑a padårtha˙/ kiµ kåraˆam/ ekasya hi kartur dvayo˙ kriyayo˙ 
pËrvakålåyåµ kriyåyåµ ktvåvidhir bhavati/ tad yathå snåtvå bhu∫kta iti/ na cåsau pËrvam utpådåt kaßcid 
asti ya˙ pËrvaµ prat¥tyottarakålam utpadyate/ na cåpy akart®kåsti kriyeti/ .../ nai∑a do∑a˙/ idaµ tåvad 
ayaµ pra∑†avya˙ ßåbdika˙/ kimavastho dharma˙ utpadyate vartamåna utåho 'någata iti/ kiµ cåta˙/ yadi 
vartamåna utpadyate/ kathaµ vartamåno yadi notpanna˙/ utpannasya vå punar utpattåv 
anavasthåprasa∫ga˙/ athånågata utpadyate katham asata˙ kart®tvaµ sidhyati (the edition has siddhaty) 
akart®kå vå kriyeti/ .../ ani∑pannaµ cedaµ yad uta ßåbdik¥yaµ ka rt®kriyåvyavasthånaµ 
bhavat¥ty e∑a ka rtå bhËti r i ty e∑å kriyå/ na cåtra bhavitur arthåt bhËtim anyåµ kriyåµ 
paßyåma˙/ tasmåd acchalaµ vyavahåre ∑u/ .   
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tasmåd acchalaµ vyavahåre∑u "Therefore there is no deception in the conventional use 
of language". 
 
 A full discussion of all the authors who deal with the problems connected with 
the correspondence principle, and of all the solutions that have been proposed, is not 
possible here. I rather suggest that we now turn to the question as to where this principle 
came from. 
 The earliest author discussed in what precedes is Någårjuna, the founder of the 
Buddhist school of thought called Madhyamaka. Is it possible that the discussions in 
other schools of the problems connected with the correspondence principle are 
ultimately due to Någårjuna's influence? Is it conceivable that other scholars — [14] 
Buddhist, Brahmanical and Jaina — read the MËlamadhyamakakårikå (and perhaps 
other works rightly or wrongly attributed to Någårjuna) and tried to come to grips with 
some of the problems there raised, without explicitly admitting their indebtedness to 
Någårjuna?  
 The fact that practically none of the early texts explicitly mentions Någårjuna or 
his works, virtually excludes the possibility of a certain and definite answer to these 
questions. The possibility of a strong, or even determining, influence from Någårjuna 
cannot however be discarded. The influence of Någårjuna on subsequent thought has 
recently been questioned,28 but such doubt seems to me wholly unjustified in view of 
the discussions which we have just considered. 
 However, it is not certain that this preoccupation with the consequences of the 
correspondence principle was only due to Någårjuna. The three versions of the Vibhå∑å 
contain a passage — translated into French by Louis de la Vallée Poussin — which 
clearly deals with the same problem.29 And it is not difficult to guess how the authors of 
                                                
28 Cp. Hayes, 1994: 299: "Någårjuna's writings had relatively little effect on the course of subsequent 
Indian Buddhist philosophy". And again: "Aside from a few commentators on Någårjuna's works, who 
identified themselves as Mådhyamikas, Indian Buddhist intellectual life continued almost as if Någårjuna 
had never existed." In a note (p. 372 n. 2) Hayes refers to an article by Richard Robinson (1972: 325), in 
which its author "drew attention to the fact that the philosophical systems at which Någårjuna's 
arguments were apparently directed ‘have not considered themselves refuted’". Note that Hayes limits 
himself to subsequent Indian Buddhist philosophy. 
29 La Vallée Poussin, 1937: 15-16 (TI 1545 ch. 76, vol. 27, p. 394b l. 19-27 (the version translated by 
LVP); TI 1546 ch. 40, vol. 28, p. 295a l. 6-11; TI 1547 ch. 7, vol. 28, p. 465c l. 11-17): "Lorsque naissent 
les conditionnés futurs, naissent-ils étant déjà nés, naissent-ils n'étant pas encore nés? Les deux 
hypothèses font difficulté. Comment? Dans la première hypothèse pourquoi ne continuent-ils pas à 
revenir? Dans la seconde, comment nierez-vous que les saµskåras existent (ou commencent d'exister) 
après inexistence (abhËtvå bhåva˙, abhËtvå bhavanam)? 
 Voici la réponse. — On peut dire (asti paryåya˙): Parce qu'il y a causes et conditions, étant déjà 
nés, ils naissent. C'est-à-dire: tous les dharmas possèdent déjà leur nature propre, car chaque futur réside 
dans son caractère essentiel (svabhåvalak∑aˆa). Possédant déjà une nature propre, ils sont dits déjà nés: ce 
n'est pas que leur nature propre soit née des causes et conditions. Étant [ensuite] produits par le concours 
des causes et des conditions, ils sont dits naître. 
 Parce qu'il y a causes et conditions, n'étant pas encore nés, ils naissent. C'est-à-dire: les dharmas 
futurs sont dits non-nés, car c'est par le fait des causes et conditions qu'ils obtiennent actuellement de 
naître. 
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these Sarvåstivåda texts solve it: things (the texts speak of course of dharmas) can come 
into being because they exist already before they come into being. The existence of 
future dharmas is a central, and ancient, tenet of the Sarvåstivådins. It allows them to 
deal with the problematic consequences of the correspondence principle. 
[15] 
 Incidentally, just two years ago the American scholar Richard P. Hayes (1994: 
372 n. 2) claimed: "Despite his (i.e., Någårjuna's, JB) apparent attempts to discredit 
some of the most fundamental concepts of abhidharma, abhidharma continued to 
flourish for centuries, without any appreciable attempt on the part of åbhidharmikas to 
defend their methods of analysis against Någårjuna's criticisms." It seems to me that 
Hayes is mistaken. We have already looked at one passage where the Sautråntika 
Vasubandhu deals with one difficulty of the type exploited by Någårjuna. And the 
Sarvåstivådin Óbhidharmikas, for their part, were immune to at least some, perhaps the 
most important, of Någårjuna's attempts to discredit them. Since for them the pot (more 
precisely, the dharma) exists before it comes into being, Någårjuna's question "Of what 
non-existent (thing) is there a cause, and of an existent (thing) what is the use of a 
cause?" has for them lost its sting. 
 Whoever may have been the first author ever to deal with the problems resulting 
from the correspondence principle, it seems to me likely that he was a Buddhist. In 
order to explain why I think so, I have to recall some rather well-known facts about the 
development of Buddhist thought, and the increasingly important role of language in it. 
 Buddhism is, first of all, a religion which teaches a path leading to the cessation 
of suffering and rebirth. Nothing in the early texts suggests that reflection on the 
relationship between language and reality was part of that path. For the origins of these 
ideas, we have to look at the special way the Buddhist message came to be handed 
down, and modified in the process. In their efforts to preserve the teachings of the 
Buddha, the early Buddhists were not content to memorize only his own words. They 
also enumerated the elements contained in his teaching, and this led to the creation of 
lists of so-called dharmas, elaborately discussed in the canonical Abhidharma-Pi†akas 
and subsequent literature. This activity, whose only intention may have been to 
preserve the teaching of the Buddha, nevertheless resulted in theoretical developments, 
which one could globally refer to as the dharma-theory. For reasons that cannot be 
                                                                                                                                         
(Only TI 1545 p. 394b l. 27 - p. 394c l. 5:) Lorsque naissent les conditionnés futurs, naissent-ils existant 
déjà ou n'existant pas? Les deux hypothèses font difficulté. Dans la première, à quoi bon naître, puisque 
leur être (svarËpa) existe déjà? Dans la seconde, on dira que les dharmas, après inexistence, existent: la 
doctrine du Sarvåstivåda tombe. 
 Voici la réponse. — On peut dire que les dharmas naissent existant déjà. 
 Vous écartez la deuxième objection, mais comment résoudre la première? 
 Comme il suit. — La nature propre (svabhåva) du dharma existe, mais non pas son activité. 
Rencontrant causes et conditions, le dharma engendre l'activité." 
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discussed here at present, the dharma-theory came to assume an ontological dimension. 
The dharmas came to be looked upon as the only really existing "elements of 
existence", which is, incidentally, the expression that is not infrequently used to 
translate the Buddhist term dharma into English. At this point Buddhism had become a 
philosophy — or at least it now included a philosophy — which possessed detailed lists 
of what there is. Things that do not figure in the lists of dharmas do not really exist, and 
this (along with other considerations) forced Buddhist thinkers to deny the reality of all 
composite objects, which includes most objects of ordinary experience. This, in its turn, 
evoked the question why everyone seems to be subject to the same delusion: everybody 
believes that there are houses [16] and chariots and the like in a world, which, in reality, 
does not contain any of these. The answer that the Buddhist thinkers proposed to this 
question is of particular interest to us in the present context. All these composite 
objects, which do not really exist, exist in name only; they are prajñaptisat. 
 I will not cite passages here in order to prove this by now rather well-known 
feature of Buddhist thought, the more not since I have done so in another publication 
that will come out soon.30 I do wish to repeat, however, that reflections on the 
relationship between composite wholes and their parts, and on the role played by words 
in all this, are not marginal to Buddhist thought. Quite on the contrary, they are central 
to it, from an early date onward. There are reasons, which cannot be repeated here, to 
think that these elements were already present in Buddhist thought in North-West India 
in the second century before our era.31 
 It is clear, then, that most Buddhists in India came to look upon the phenomenal 
world as not really existing, and as being in an important way produced by the words of 
language. Objects in the phenomenal world owe their existence — or rather: the 
appearance of existence — to words. 
 It is against this background that the correspondence principle becomes 
understandable, and almost self-evident. If it is agreed that objects in the phenomenal 
world are somehow determined by words, is it not reasonable to go one step further and 
claim that the words of a statement determine the elements that constitute the situation 
described by that statement? 
 Note further that the general idea that things in the phenomenal world somehow 
correspond to the words of language did not remain without echo outside Buddhist 
thought. Vaiße∑ika, in particular, accepted much the same idea, with one important 
difference. The Buddhists looked upon the objects in the phenomenal world as not 
ultimately real; the Vaiße∑ikas believed that they were real. But both agreed that they 
                                                
30 Bronkhorst, 1996a; which makes abundant use of Williams, 1980; 1981. 
31 Bronkhorst, 1996a, with reference to 1987: 71. 
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somehow corresponded to the words of language.32 We can now understand all the 
better why the Vaiße∑ikas took the correspondence principle so seriously, so much so 
that they, the asatkåryavådins par excellence, were pushed to a position extremely close 
to the rejected satkåryavåda. 
 Whatever the origin of the correspondence principle, I do believe that it allows 
us to understand a number of philosophical positions and arguments from roughly the 
first half of the first millennium of the common era. Arguments based on this principle 
are common during that period, but seem to slowly disappear after it. I hope that the 
few examples I have been able to discuss with you have convinced [17] you of the 
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